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NOTE
EQUAL PAY: THE HOSPITAL-NURSING HOME DILEMMA
The Equal Pay Act of 19631 (EPA) is not an independent piece of legis-
lation, but rather an amendment to existing legislation. The EPA simply
adds an additional fair labor standard to the already familiar Fair Labor
Standards Act of 19382 (FLSA) [hereinafter alternately referred to as "the
Act"]. By utilizing the process of amendment, Congress hoped to avoid
the creation of a new bureaucratic structure to enforce the new law,8 and
hoped to facilitate compliance because both industry and labor were already
aware of the operation and provisions of the FLSA.4 However, what ap-
peared to be a simple matter has nevertheless become the subject of con-
siderable litigation. Although "equal pay for equal work" is a now familiar
concept to attorneys practicing in the field of labor law, litigation has re-
cently taken on a new look as hospitals and nursing homes now begin to
feel the effect of the EPA. It is the purpose of this article to explore the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act in an attempt to determine when and how
it should be applied to these institutions, and through an examination of a
body of cases, to reflect a trend that is now unfavorably emerging for the
employer.
I. BAsIc COVERAGE PROVISIONS
The equal pay provisions neither extend nor curtail coverage under the
FLSA. Necessarily then, when the question arises whether an employer
need comply with the equal pay legislation, one must inquire whether he
is subject to the FLSA. The question of coverage generally is complex, and
it is beyond the scope of this article to explore the intricacies and ramifica-
tions of the law in complete detail. The following explanation will show,
however, that when directed towards hospitals and nursing homes, the ques-
tion of coverage is answered almost exclusively in the affirmative.
129 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). For the legislative history of the EPA see 1963 US. Code
Cong. &" Adm. News 687-92.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
3 The task of administration and enforcement fell to the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor. This agency was already well established and skilled in
the administration of the FLSA.
4 1963 US. Code Cong. & Adm. News 688.
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A. The Enterprise Concept
Prior to 1961, only those individual employees actually engaged in com-
merce5 or the production of goods for commerce6 were entitled to
the benefits of the Act. By virtue of the 1961 and 1966 amendments, the
scope of coverage was broadened, and is now founded on the concept of
the "enterprise." An enterprise as defined in the Act means "related activi-
ties performed (either through unified operation or common control) by
any person or persons for a common business purpose. . . ." 7 It is difficult
to conceive of any business conducted in a single establishment 8 that would
not be classified as an enterprise. Standing alone, however, the classification
of "enterprise" is of little significance,9 for the enterprise must also be an
"enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for com-
merce." Such an enterprise is defined as one that has two or more employees
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, and that
has an Annual Gross Dollar Volume (AGDV) of sales made or business
done of not less than $250,000, or is among those enumerated enterprises
that need not satisfy the AGDV test.10 Once the enterprise has been de-
termined to be engaged in commerce or the production of goods for com-
merce, all its employees unless otherwise exempt" are entitled to the bene-
fits of the Act whether or not they themselves are so engaged.
Hospitals and nursing homes are among those enumerated enterprises that
need not satisfy the AGDV test, provided they are "primarily engaged in
the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on
the premises .... ,, 12 Therefore, the only inquiry with respect to coverage
5Prior to the 1961 Amendments, coverage was founded on an individual employee
basis, hence the term "individual coverage." Although this type of coverage is rarely
asserted today, it is still in force. For an explanation of these terms see note 13 infra.
old.
729 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1970).
8The term "establishment" is not defined in the Act, but it generally refers to a
distinct physical place of business. Each separate place of business is usually considered
to be a single establishment. For a more complete explanation of this concept see 29
C.F.R. § 800.108 (1972).
9 Where the business is carried on at more than one establishment, these separate
establishments may be grouped together under certain circumstances and denominated
an enterprise. This is beneficial to the Secretary in that he may then look to the entire
organization to find two or more employees who are engaged in commerce, and thus
establish coverage. Generally, however, this concept is of little importance when deal-
ing with hospitals and nursing homes because the business will probably be carried on
in a single establishment. Furthermore, the duties of employees may only be compared
within a single establishment.
1029 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
"1 Certain employees are exempt from the operation of the FLSA. For an explanation
of these exemptions see 29 C.F.R. § 541 (1972).
12 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (4) (1970).
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of these institutions is whether they have two or more employees who are
"engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." The
terms "engaging in commerce" and "production of goods for commerce"
have received extensive treatment in both court decisions and official in-
terpretations.'3 However, it is clear from the Act that among other things,
these terms include "the handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods14
that have been moved in or produced for commerce .... 15 Drugs, food,
hospital supplies, and mail correspondence are all classified as "goods" for the
purposes of the Act. In almost every case, it will be found that such goods
are utilized by these institutions, and that a large portion of them originate
out of state, or in the case of insurance forms and other correspondence, are
transmitted out of state. Accordingly, these are "goods" that "have been
moved in or produced for commerce." It is unequivocally clear therefore,
that any hospital or nursing home that employs doctors, nurses, cooks, and
administrative personnel will have two or more employees who "handle or
otherwise work on" these goods, and therefore, will be considered to be
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce. Conse-
quently, the institution becomes an "enterprise engaged in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce" and accordingly, all of its employees
will be entitled to the benefits of the Act.
II. THE EQUAL PAY Acr
The EPA comprises section 6(d) of the FLSA and provides in part that
"[n]o employer ... shall discriminate . . . between employees on the
basis of sex by paying wages to employees .. .at a rate less than the rate
at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . .or equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.. .... 16
The obvious purpose of the law is to eliminate the payment of a discrimina-
tory wage rate where such discrimination is based on the sex of the em-
ployee.17
The EPA also provides three specific exceptions and a broad general ex-
ception. Where discrimination is based upon (1) a seniority system, (2) a
13 These terms are defined in 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.6 and 800.7 (1972).
14" 'Goods' means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products,
commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any
part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual
physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufac-
turer, or processor thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (i) (1970).
15 29 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (1970).
1629 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1970).
17 See 1963 US. Code Cong. & Adm. News 668.
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merit system, (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production, or (4) a differential based on any other factor other than sex,
the discriminatory wage rate will be exempt from the operation of the
statute.'8
It is well settled that the Secretary has the burden of proving the existence
of a discriminatory wage differential based on sex; once he has satisfied
this, the burden shifts to the employer to bring himself within one of the
four exceptions.19 The Secretary's case therefore requires a showing that
there are in fact two dissimilar wage rates, and that these rates are paid to
employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs that require equal skill,
effort, and responsibility and that require performance under similar work-
ing conditions. The employer then has the burden of showing that the wages
are the same, or that the work is not equal by virtue of the fact that per-
formance of certain jobs requires more effort, skill, or responsibility, or that
they are performed under dissimilar working conditions. If the employer
is unable to defend in this manner, he must show that the wage rates are
paid pursuant to one of the four enumerated exceptions.
III. OFFICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
The Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division are authorized to issue official interpretations regarding the posi-
tion of the Department of Labor with respect to the meaning and application
of the FLSA.20 These interpretive bulletins are intended to reflect the con-
struction of the law which the Secretary and Administrator believe to be
correct, and which the Department will follow in the administration and
enforcement of the Act, unless and until such law is otherwise changed
upon re-examination or by judicial decision.2 ' The significance and weight
to be attributed to such directives was determined by the Supreme Court in
Skidmore vu. SWift,22 where the Court stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Ad-
ministrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
18 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1970).
19Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1971); Shultz v.
First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969); Hodgson v. City Stores, Inc,
332 F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
2o29 C.F.R. § 800.2 (1972).
21 Id.
22 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.23
In accordance with his authority, the Administrator has caused to be issued
certain guidelines to be followed in determining "equal work" under the
EPA.24 Cursory perusal of these directives reveals the fundamental prin-
ciple that in order for work to be equal, the jobs in question must require
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and must be performed under similar
working conditions. If one or more of these requirements is determined
to be unequal, the employees are not entitled to the benefits of the legisla-
tion.25 However, equal does not mean identical, and "[i]nsubstantial or
minor differences in the degree or amount of skill, or effort, or responsibility
required for the performance of jobs will not render the equal pay standard
inapplicable." 28
Although the Administrator concedes that those factors that constitute
equal skill, effort and responsibility cannot be precisely defined, 2 he does
offer certain criteria for consideration in making such an evaluation.
A. Equal Skill
Among those factors to be considered when evaluating the requirement
of equal skill are experience, training, education and ability.28 The Ad-
ministrator cautions, however, that these must be "measured in terms of
the performance requirements of the job," i.e., the possession of a skill not
needed to meet the job requirements should not be considered in determin-
ing equality of skill.29
.To further point up the principles to be utilized in comparing skill re-
quirements, the Administrator provides an illustration.30 Suppose that the
jobs of nurses' aide (female) and orderly (male) require that these employees
spend two-thirds of their working time in the same activities (primary
work), and the remaining one-third in diversified tasks that are not neces-
sarily the same for the respective positions (secondary work). Since there
is no difference in the skills required for the primary activities, the determi-
nation of equal skill in overall performance must necessarily depend upon
23 Id. at 140.
24 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.0 through 800.166 (1972).
25 29 C.F.R. § 800.122 (1972).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1972).
29 Id.
0 The exact illustration appears at 29 C.F.R. § 800.126 (1972). It has, however, been
modified by the author so that it may be compared more readily to actual court deci-
sions involving aides and orderlies.
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the nature of the secondary tasks. If the job requirements of the secondary
work performed by the orderly require more training and command a
higher wage than the primary work, and if the secondary tasks of the
nurses' aide require less training and command a lower wage whether per-
formed by aide or orderly, then the orderly's job will be considered to
require a substantially different degree of skill, and accordingly the equal
pay standard will not be applicable.
This illustration seemingly suggests a dual inquiry: (1) Does the second-
ary work of the orderly require more training and command a higher wage
than the primary work; and, (2) if so, does the secondary work performed
by the nurses' aide-if in fact she performed secondary tasks-require less
training and command a lower wage than the secondary work performed
by the orderly? Where both questions are answered affirmatively and the
differences are not inconsequential, the job of the orderly requires more skill.
B. Equal Effort
In explanation of this requirement, the Administrator offers: "Where
substantial differences exist in the amount or degree of effort required to be
expended in the performance of jobs, the equal pay standard cannot apply
even though the jobs may be equal in all other respects. Effort is concerned
with the measurement of the physical or mental exertion needed for the
performance of a job." 81 Differences in the kind of effort, however, do
not justify wage differentials, 32 and "the occasional or sporadic perform-
ance of an activity which may require extra physical or mental exertion is
not alone sufficient to justify a finding of unequal effort." 88
As an illustration, suppose that the aide and the orderly perform primary
work that requires equal effort. The orderly, however, is also called to per-
form secondary activities that require extra effort, e.g., heavy lifting, an
activity not performed by the aide. A wage differential, therefore, might be
justified "provided that the extra effort so expended is substantial and is
performed over a considerable portion of the work cycle." 84
The illustration appears to base the test for equal effort on a single inquiry.
Where the primary work is otherwise equal, does the secondary work of
the orderly require a greater amount or degree of effort than the secondary
work of the aide-if in fact the aide performs secondary tasks? Where the
question is answered affirmatively and the difference is not inconsequential,
the orderly's job requires more effort.
3129 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1972).
82 i.
83 29 C.F.R. § 800.128 (1972).
341d. Again the illustration has been adapted to the hospital-nursing home situation.
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It should be noted that the differential based on a difference in degree
or amount of effort must be applied uniformly to men and women. The
fact that one half of the orderlies perform heavy lifting and the others do
not would not justify a higher wage differential for all orderlies.35
C. Equal Responsibility
The Administrator offers very little in this area to guide the employer in
making his determination, and the illustrations given are not readily adaptable
to the aide-orderly relationship and functions. Clearly, however, where one
employee has the additional responsibility of extinguishing the lights at the
end of the day, such a task would not be of sufficient consequence to justify
a finding of unequal responsibility. On the other hand, where an employee
has the additional responsibility of determining whether to accept personal
checks from customers, this task might well warrant the payment of a
higher wage.36
The interpretive bulletin states that "[r]esponsibility is concerned with
the degree of accountability required in the performance of the job, with
emphasis on the importance of the job obligation." 37 It would seem funda-
mental therefore that although the primary work performed by the aide
and the orderly is otherwise equal in responsibility, the secondary and
tertiary activities that are dissimilar will be attended by differences in re-
sponsibility. Such differences in responsibility, however, would not warrant
a finding of unequal responsibility unless the importance of the job obliga-
tion of the orderly with respect to the secondary and tertiary activities
resulted in a significant increase in the degree of accountability as compared
to that of the nurses' aide, and such increase in degree of accountability was
a significant factor in determining wage rates.
D. Similar Working Conditions
Again, although very little direction is offered by the Administrator, he
has made it clear that "a practical judgment is required in the light of
whether the differences in working conditions are the kind customarily
taken into consideration in setting wage levels." 3 8 Accordingly, "slight or
inconsequential differences in working conditions that are essentially similar
would not justify a differential in pay," because "such differences are not
usually taken into consideration by employers ...in setting wage rates." 39
29 C.F.R. § 800.128 (1972).
86 29 C.F.R. § 800.130 (1972).
3*7 29 C.F.R. § 800.129 (1972).
38 29 C.F.R. § 800.131 (1972).
M 29 C.F.R. § 800.132 (1972).
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From an examination of the official interpretations it can be readily seen
that in order for any one of the requirements to bar the application of the
equal pay standard, it must be of some consequence. Time spent will be of
primary importance when evaluating the requirements of equal skill and
equal effort. The law is unquestionably clear on the point that "insub-
stantial or minor differences in the degree or amount of skill, or effort, or
responsibility required for the performance of jobs will not render the equal
pay standards inapplicable." 40
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Although the Equal Pay Act was passed in 1963, cases involving hospitals
and nursing homes did not appear in the courts until 1969. The reason for
this delay can be attributed to a number of factors. Because Congress pro-
vided for a one year moratorium on enforcement, the EPA did not become
effective until 1964. 41 More important however, Congress broadened the
scope of coverage under the Act in 1966, to be effective February 1, 1967,42
and specifically evidenced its intent that hospitals and nursing homes should
be subject to its provisions. Prior to this amendment, a hospital or nursing
home would not be covered unless it could meet an AGDV require-
ment of $1,000,000. 43 In addition, the normal period investigated by the
Wage and Hour Division is two years. Therefore, in order to assert the
coverage that became effective in 1967 over one of these institutions, the
period investigated necessarily must have run from 1967 to 1969. The slow
process of disposition through the Solicitor's Office in a case of this nature
usually requires six months to a year, and as a result, the first case did not
appear until 1969.
A. Decisions
By far the most significant case involving hospitals and nursing homes
has been Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital.44 Because of the impact
of this decision, it is instructive to analyze it in some detail. After stipu-
lating in the court below that the primary duties of the aide and the orderly
were equal, the defendant hospital argued that the secondary and tertiary
duties performed by the orderlies of lifting patients (effort), catheterization
(skill), and serving as fire brigade chief (responsibility), were sufficient to
40 29 C.F.R. 5 800.122 (1972).
4129 C.F.R. 5 800.101 (1972).
42 See "Effective Date of 1966 Amendment" set out in notes under 29 U.S.C. § 203
(1970).
4329 U.S.C.A. § 203(s) (1) (1965).
44 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
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warrant the wage differential. Addressing itself to the hospital's contention,
the trial court stated that "only an insignificant portion of an orderly's
time is spent in performing catheterizations, [and that] those tasks performed
only by aides require as much skill as the performance of a catheterization
which orderlies perform on male patients"; 45 serving as a fire brigade chief
was only a "minor duty," and "the occasional performance of duties re-
quiring greater physicial exertion does not render jobs unequal which are
otherwise equal." 40 Echoing the familiar proposition that "equal does not
mean identical," and that "insubstantial differences in the skill, effort, and
responsibility requirements of particular jobs should be ignored," 47 the
lower court held that "[t]he work of orderlies and aides required substan-
tially equal skill, effort, and responsibility and was performed under similar
working conditions." 48
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court agreed with the trial
judge's ruliig in part, stating that she49 was justified in finding that the
secondary and tertiary tasks performed only by aides required as much
skill and involved as much responsibility as those performed by orderlies. In
sanctioning the lower court's holding on this point, the review court in effect
reduced the determination of "equal work" to a consideration of equal
effort alone.50 Under the Brookhaven decision, it is difficult to conceive
of a hospital that could not offset the more highly technical skill involved in
catheterization with the seemingly routine jobs of caring for infants and
convalescing mothers.5' The appellate court would have done well to have
placed emphasis on the lower courts finding that the performance of cath-
eterizations required an insubstantial amount of time.
The court also focused on the hospital's most convincing argument,
which contended that although an aide and an orderly have approximately
the same number of patients, the orderly is called away to perform second-
ary and tertiary duties far more frequently than the aide, while the same
primary duties await him on return. This practice of the hospital thereby
forces the typical orderly "to compress into 75 percent of his working
time the routine patient duties which occupy something like 98 percent of
the working time of the typical aide." 52 In short, the hospital maintained
45 Shultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424,425 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
46d at 426.
47 ld.
48 Id.
49 It is interesting to note that the judge in this discrimination case was a female.
50 The circuit court also found that the working conditions were similar.
51 The trial court found the secondary duties of the nurses' aides to be: working in
the delivery room, the maternity ward or the nursery, and giving sitz baths, douches and
clinical tests.52 Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp, 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970).
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that its orderlies are called on to do a significantly greater volume of work,
thereby rendering unequal the amount of effort expended. In examining
the requirement of equal effort, the review court stated:
The equal effort criterion has received substantial play in the reported
cases to date. As the doctrine is emerging, jobs do not entail equal
effort, even though they entail most of the same routine duties, if the
more highly paid job involves additional tasks which (1) require extra
effort, (2) consume a significant amount of the time of all those 'whose
pay differentials are to be justified in terms of them, and, (3) are of an
economic value commensurate 'with the pay differential. We are per-
suaded that this approach to the application of the statutory "equal
effort" criterion is in keeping with the fundamental purposes of the
Equal Pay Act, and adopt it here53 (emphasis added).
The court then noted that the trial judge had not made sufficient findings
of fact in order that it might apply the newly formulated test. Accord-
ingly, the case was reversed and remanded for supplemental findings."
The significance of the Brookhaven decision therefore lies in its shift
of emphasis to the "equal effort" criterion, and its accompanying standards
for making such an evaluation. Further, the decision requires specific find-
ings of fact in cases of this nature, thereby eliminating any perfunctory
disposition by the lower courts. Trial judges are now properly required
to investigate the number of orderlies, if any, who participate in the sec-
ondary activities, and the exact extent of their participation. "Time spent"
therefore is an important factor in determining equal effort. In addition,
the court impliedly held that where an orderly is called to perform twenty-
three percent more work in secondary and tertiary duties, over and above
the total work performed by the aide, such a job requirement might well be
considered to require extra effort, consume the requisite amount of time,
and be of an economic value commensurate with the pay differential.
Accordingly, such a requirement may preclude the application of the equal
pay standard.
In accordance with the Brookhaven decision, the district court in Hodg-
W Id.
54 On remand the court found the hospital's contention that the orderlies were called
to do a significantly greater volume of work was not supported by any credible and
convincing testimony. The court concluded that the secondary and tertiary duties
were "substantially the same kind of general hospital duties as the primary duties and
are not any more exacting in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility. The orderlies do
not exert significantly more effort than aides because of these 'secondary and tertiary'
duties, which consume only a minor and insignificant amount of the time of the order-
lies who have been considered as the counterparts of the aides." Hodgson v. Brook-
haven Gen. Hosp., 65 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,843, 44,844 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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son v. Maison Miramon, Inc.,5 in a well written opinion, applied the equal
effort test. Although the defendant conceded that the duties of aides and
orderlies required equal skill and responsibility, it argued that the amount
of effort expended was unequal, and warranted the pay differential. After
a thorough consideration of conflicting testimony, the court found that
some of the orderlies did perform functions requiring more physical exertion
than the aides could provide; however, these added labors did not con-
sume a significant amount of time. The additional duties on which the de-
fendant relied were basically custodial in nature. The court noted that while
the janitors at the institution were exclusively engaged in the performance
of such heavy custodial duties, the orderlies were only required to perform
them during a portion of their working time. Nevertheless, the salaries of
the janitors were the same as those of the orderlies. This situation led the
court to conclude that because the defendant did not place any particular
emphasis on the degree of effort expended when establishing pay rates,
the extra duties of the orderlies were not of "an economic value commen-
surate with the pay differential." 56
In Maison Miramon, obviously reluctant to find in favor of the Secretary
and although constrained to do so, the trial judge seriously questioned the
propriety of the EPA. 7 The opinion suggests that the result might have
been different had the defendant been able to advance arguments on the
requirement of "equal skill." As previously noted, the defendant conceded
this point, relying alone On equal effort Bound by the mandate in Brook-
haven, the trial judge had no choice but to find for the plaintiff.
The decision in Maison Miramon is not unique. Other courts have deter-
mined that the amount of time spent by orderlies in the performance of
secondary duties is insubstantial and inconsequential, and therefore not suffi-
cient to warrant a finding of unequal effortPs To the contrary, however,
is Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hospital.59 Here the court found that order-
lies were called to perform arduous work requiring more physical effort
and strength than the work of aides, and that these duties consumed as
much as twenty-five percent of the orderlies' time. The court noted that
"[t]he lifting and strength demanding work of the orderly is not merely
occasional but is shown to be one of the main functions that is demanded
55 344 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. La. 1972).
ticAccord, Hodgson v. Skyvue Terrace, Inc., 68 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,395 (WD. Pa.
1972).
57 Hodgson v. Maison Miramon, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 843 n.9 (E.D. La. 1972).
68 Hodgson v. Stastny, 67 CCH Lab. Gas. 45,265 (N.D. IM. 1972); Hodgson v. Mc-
Murray Hills Manor, Inc., 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,066 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Hodgson v.
Hubbard Hosp, 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,009 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
59 327 F. Supp. 143 (ED. Tex. 1971).
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of the orderly with great frequency and regularity."GO The trial judge
went on to note that were the hospital not necessarily dependent on the
male orderly to perform these jobs, it could have hired all females and saved
any pay differential. Accordingly, the court concluded that "[t]hese addi-
tional duties are of economic value commensurate with the pay differen-
tial." 61
To a similar effect was Shultz v. Royal Glades, Inc.,62 wherein the district
court found that fifty to sixty percent of the orderlies' time was spent in
lifting patients. In addition, the orderlies were required to lift and carry
250 pound oxygen tanks and patient's luggage. In order to perform these
duties, it was necessary to report for work one hour earlier than the
nurses' aides. Testimony of the aides having proved that these duties were
beyond the aides' physical capabilities, the court concluded that "the
work performed by the orderlies regularly requires significantly more
effort. ..." 63
Notwithstanding that the Brookhaven decision seemingly limits the in-
quiry to that of "equal effort," there are other cases that have turned on the
requirements of equal skill or equal responsibility. Shultz v. Kentucky Bap-
tist Hospital64 was the pilot decision involving a hospital under the EPA.
Although the hospital employed approximately 202 nurses' aides and 31
orderlies,65 the Secretary did not charge discrimination throughout the
entire hospital, but limited his complaint to the psychiatric ward in which
the hospital employed six orderlies and 16 aides. 66 The court, noting the
various tasks performed solely by orderlies that required extra physical
strength and skill, did not evaluate these duties in terms of time spent so that
they might be shown to be "substantial" and warrant a higher wage dif-
ferential. Rather, the court focused on the fact that there was "at least one
important basic duty and responsibility of the orderly that is not and can-
not be assumed or performed by the nurses' aide. That duty and responsi-
bility is to assure security and provide protection to the aides in the psy-
chiatric ward, and not only to the patients but to the nurses' aides as well
as to the registered nurses (emphasis added). '" 67 The court therefore
determined that providing security was in fact a duty, that "the orderly is
performing this duty at all times while he is on the shift working," and
that "the responsibility of furnishing security to patients and to personnel
6o Id. at 147.
61 Id. at 148.
6266 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,934 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
631d. at 44,936.
64 62-CCH Lab. Cas. 44,117 (W.D. Ky. 1969).
65 Id. at 44,118.
66 Id. at 44,119.
67 Id. at 44,121.
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in the psychiatric unit in itself [was] a responsibility that justifies the
difference in compensation." s Query: Would the result have been the
same had the Secretary not limited his suit solely to the psychiatric ward?
In Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Homes, Inc.'9 the emphasis was
again on responsibility. Here the court attached great significance to the
fact that orderlies were required to "float," i.e., to help throughout the
entire nursing home, a duty that the aides were not required to perform.
With regard to this additional duty the court noted:
[I]t should be observed that each orderly has the responsibility of
helping all of the aides with all of the male patients, both in the area
the orderly is originally assigned to as well as being available to the
other two nurses' stations. No nurses' aide had the same responsibility
as any full time orderly.70
In addition to the requirement of equal work, the court in Good Shep-
herd Hospital also focused on the necessity of equal skill, attaching par-
ticular significance to the performance of catheterization by the orderlies.
After noting that orderlies were required to have attended training courses
to learn this skill, the court stated:
The orderly has special training to do and does male catheterization
which is an extremely important hospital duty, calling for skill and
training in sterile techniques not possessed by aides. Aides do not
even perform catheterizations of female patients. Male catheterization
is an important hospital function and is a special skill developed by
training from urologists, and-the senior orderly. This duty was per-
formed by orderlies ranging from several a day to several a week
consuming up to forty-five minutes of time. The hospital rules have
prohibited nurses' aides from performing this procedure (even on
females) since February 1, 1967. The importance of the orderly job
is not confined to actual catheterization done-but his availability to
do them.7'
08 Id. at 44,124. "Orderlies perform another essential function that could not be per-
formed by aides. They provide a psychological effect and approach because of the
fact that they are males. The presence of a male orderly represents security to personnel
that an aide cannot give:' Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 64 CCH Lab.
Cas. 44,607, 44,609 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
69 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,607 (SD. Fla. 1971).
l0id. at 44,609. "As to responsibility for the whole Hospital, emergency calls,
security, catheterizations, setting up orthopedic equipment, different working conditions,
emergency room work of the orderly, these are clearly more than an incidental or
occasional matter but the gravamen and crux of the real and primary work of the
orderly...." Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 148 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
l1 Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 145 (ED. Tex. 1971). But
see Hodgson v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Assn., Inc., 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,923 (ED.
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In contrast, the requirement of similar working conditions has received
very little attention by the courts. However, again in Good Shepherd
Hospital, the court found that the fact that orderlies were required to work
all over the hospital, perform under demanding conditions in the emergency
room and deal with the hard to handle patients, made their job unpleasant,
dangerous, and more taxing, resulting in dissimilar working conditions.72
Under some circumstances, the courts have found that the defendant
hospitals have brought themselves under one of the statutory exceptions.
Although the court in Golden Isles Nursing Home found that the Secretary
had not sustained his burden of proving a differential based on sex, the trial
judge nevertheless noted that the defendant hospital did have a merit system
that governed the employees' salaries. The initial salaries of both orderlies
and aides were determined by past experience, personal interviews, educa-
tional qualifications, and prior training. All subsequent pay raises were
based on regular employee evaluations, with criteria including performance,
reliability, initiative, and responsibilities.73
Although each case presents a different factual situation, it is interesting
to note that despite the above decisions, favorable to the defendant hospitals
and nursing homes, there have been others that have held directly contra
on identical issues. Courts have found that the presence of male orderlies
to afford a measure of protection is not a duty at all, and that the perform-
ance of catheterizations does not warrant a wage differential. However, it is
submitted that close scrutiny will reveal that a good portion of these decisions
may well be "consent decrees." 74 The findings of fact and conclusions of
Pa. 1971) (consent decree); Hodgson v. Cheviot Hills Convalarium, 67 CCH Lab.
Cas. 45,210 (C.D. Cal. 1972).72 Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Tex. 1971). See Shultz
v. Royal Glades, Inc., 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,934 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
73 Hodgson v. Golden Isles Nursing Home, Inc., 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,607, 44,609
(S.D. Fla. 1971).
74 When a defendant agrees to settle a case, the Solicitor's Office prepares a com-
plaint, stipulation, and judgment, and forwards them to the appropriate court so that
the order may be entered granting the injunction and back wages. Under some circum-
stances the Commerce Clearing House will report these cases. It appears that the report
of the case amounts to nothing more than a reiteration of the "package deal" submitted
by the Labor Department. It is easy to see how the Secretary could use this oppor-
tunity to establish favorable precedent, as defendants are not particularly concerned
with the way the complaint, stipulation, and judgment are phrased; they are only con-
cerned with the court's order which has already been agreed upon. It is submitted that
the following cases are possible consent judgments:
1. Hodgson v. McMurray Hills Manor, Inc., 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,066 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
2. Hodgson v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Assn., Inc., 66 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,923
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
3. Hodgson v. Cheviot Hills Convalarium, 67 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,210 (C.D. Cal.
1972).
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law in these cases seemingly suggest that the Secretary has taken advantage
of his opportunities to establish false precedent, obviously affording the
Department of Labor a stronger bargaining position. Therefore, when con-
fronted with these decisions, a hospital or nursing home representative
might well be disposed to settle a case on unfavorable terms where other-
wise he would not.
V. CONCLUSION
Although entitled to great deference, the Secretary's interpretive bulletins
are vague in many respects and provide little guidance for the employer.
Consequently, the applicable district court decisions are diametrically
opposed to each other. The most frequently advanced arguments of cath-
eterization (skill), presence of orderlies to control unruly patients (respon-
sibility), and heavy lifting (effort), may be readily accepted in one court
while flatly rejected in another. Because the district court opinions do not
adequately relate the facts relative to the nature and extent of the orderlies'
participation in these activities, it is impossible to point to any group of
decisions to formulate a rule. Thus, the burden of clarification clearly lies
with the Circuit Courts.
Brookhaven General Hospital is the only appellate opinion to date. If
there is in fact an emerging trend, therefore, it rests solely on this decision
and is doubtless unfavorable to the employer. The Brookhaven court has
taken the initiative and has delineated a definite test to be applied when
dealing with the requirement of equal effort. The mandate is somewhat
strict, calling for particularization on the part of the defendant. It is a diffi-
cult task indeed for a hospital to prove the extent of participation in a
particular activity by an entire class of employees, especially when con-
fronted with self-serving witnesses, i.e., aides who realize that their testi-
mony might well result in a windfall in the form of back wages and a sub-
sequent salary increase. Moreover, Brookhaven has undermined the valid
arguments concerning equal skill and responsibility by adopting the Secre-
tary's interpretation that where the job requirements of the orderly can be
proved to require extra skill and responsibility, such distinctions may be
set off by the job requirements of the nurses' aide. Admittedly, these
areas are nebulous, and it is difficult to determine whether the performance
of a catheterization requires more skill than the care of infants and new
mothers. However, the decision is not without some merit, as it is con-
sistent with the broad remedial purpose of the FLSA.
4. Hodgson v. Stastny, 67 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,265 (N.D. Ii. 1972).
5. Hodgson v. Beverly Enterprises, 68 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,376 (ED. Cal. 1972).
6. Hodgson v. South Shore Convacare, Inc., 67 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,186 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
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Thus, from an examination of the decisions to date, it seems safe to con-
clude that the law is in a state of confusion. In view of this, and when
confronted by the Wage and Hour Division and faced with the prospect
of paying as much as $100,000 in back wages, hospitals and nursing homes
will face a continuing dilemma until definite guidelines are established by
administrative and judicial interpretation.
W. L. P., III
